



# THE COMMONWEALTH.

Fayette Circuit Court--August Term, 1857.

Hagan vs. Dudley.

OPINION OF JUDGE GOODLOE.

This action is brought by Hagan to recover damages of Dudley for denying him the privilege of voting, at the second election precinct, in the city of Lexington, at the late August election. The petition alleges, that the plaintiff is a free white male person above the age of twenty-one years, and had, previous to his application to vote, continuously resided one year next preceding the election in the second election precinct, in the city of Lexington, and had on the 24th of July, 1857, been naturalized under the act of Congress, by the City Court of Lexington; all of which was proven to the satisfaction of the judges and the defendant--and that the Judges deferred in opinion as to the plaintiff's right to vote, and that the duty devolved upon the defendant, as Sheriff to decide, and that the defendant, with the intent unlawfully to deprive the plaintiff of the exercise of his right to vote, willfully and knowingly prevented him from voting.

To this position the defendant demurred--as signing for cause under the Code: 1st. The petition does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 2nd. The City Court of Lexington had no power to hear applications and grant certificates of naturalization, and 3rd. That the residence of the plaintiff, since the grant of his certificate, was not sufficient to entitle him to vote.

These several grounds of demurral will be considered in the order in which they are presented. Without considering the first cause of demurral in that enlarged sense which would include the other two, the narrower view of it presents two questions: 1st. May a legal voter maintain a civil action against the officers of elections for refusing him the right to vote; and 2nd. As the defendant acted in a judicial capacity, are the allegations of the petition sufficient to charge him.

In considering the first of these questions, it is to be regretted that so little is to be found either in the reports or elementary works in the form of direct authority. The only authority I have been referred to, or been able to find, is the case of Asbury vs. White, reported in 2nd Lord Raymond's Reports, page 938. When that case was before the King's Bench, three out of the four judges decided against the action, and, although it was afterwards reversed in the House of Lords by a large majority, the decision has only the sanction of four of the twelve Judges; and whilst, therefore, the ease is to be regarded in England as authoritative, in favor of the action, it is entitled to but little respect in the American courts, and is certainly not authoritative. I think, however, upon general principles, the action is maintainable. In this country the right of the qualified freeman to vote is a legal vested right.

It is his legal franchise. Through it he has not only the right to have his voice in the selection of those who are to pass laws affecting his life, liberty, property, and reputation--but all those who administer and execute these laws. It pertains to his dignity as a freeman. Concede that this privilege is not a matter of property or profit, and it does not appear that he has sustained any pecuniary injury--neither is a man's reputation technically a matter of property or profit; yet he may maintain an action of slander, without alleging pecuniary injury. The violation of his right to his good name entitles him to a remedy. In the language of Chief Justice Holt, "It is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal." 2nd. In deciding upon the plaintiff's right to vote, the defendant acted in a judicial capacity. The statute devolves upon the sheriff the duty of deciding when the judges differ, and in making this decision he is acting as a judge of the election, and is entitled to all the protection which the law extends to other judicial officers, acting within the scope of their jurisdiction. But it is well settled that if a judge, in a case legally before him, decides wrong, with the corrupt intent to injure either of the litigating parties, he is liable to the action of the party aggrieved. The petition charges the defendant with willfully and knowingly deciding wrong, with the intent to deprive the plaintiff of his right to vote. It is essential that he should have super-added the word "corruptly?" I think not. If the decision was given willfully and knowingly wrong, with the intent charged--it constitutes legal corruption. I am of opinion, therefore, that the first cause of demurral, in the sense I have considered it, is insufficient to defeat the plaintiff's action.

The second cause of demurral, involves a very grave question, the decision of which I would willingly avoid, if the case before me permitted it. It calls in question the uniform action of many of the State Courts for more than a half century, and involves the elective right of a large number of persons who have heretofore been considered legal voters, as also extensive rights of property. But still, if all this action has been without lawful authority, and all these supposed rights unfounded in law, I have no right to make the defendant the victim of it, and he has a right to demand my best judgment upon the legality of his conduct, irrespective of this usage, or how it may affect others. The question upon this cause of demurral arises under a proper construction of written laws, and no length of usage or practice against the law can abrogate or modify it--but can at most only furnish persuasive evidence of what the law is, and inspire caution in reaching a contrary conclusion. A contrary doctrine would subvert the foundation of all law, and enable usage against law to repeal or abrogate it. Let us proceed, then, in the light of a fair exposition of the written laws, aided by authoritative judicial expositions, to examine this question.

The City Court of Lexington, created by the act incorporating that city, is constituted a Court of Record, with a seal and clerk, and is vested with a limited common law jurisdiction, in certain cases arising within the city limits. Its various subjects of jurisdiction are specifically enumerated in the charter, and embraces common law misdemeanors, penal statutes, and ordinances--the arrest and binding over of criminals for final trial in the Circuit Court, and the civil jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. It possesses under the State law no jurisdiction beyond what is enumerated in the charter, and it may be safely assumed, that the right to admit aliens to citizenship, is not one of its enumerated cases of jurisdiction, and if it possesses any power or authority in this respect, it derives it from the act of Congress, approved 12th April 1802, and not from any law of the State, either granting or allowing it.

Waiving the question, whether this City Court, with its limited local common law jurisdiction, is a Court of "Common Law jurisdiction" within the meaning of the act above referred to, of which I have serious doubts, the more important question arises, has Congress, under the Constitution, the power to confer this authority or jurisdiction upon the City Court of Lexington, and this involves the further enquiry as to the nature of the power exercised in naturalizing aliens under the act of Congress.

By recurring to the act of 1802, it will be perceived that the determination of the question, whether or not an alien shall become a citizen, is referred to a Court of Record, having a seal and clerk, and common law jurisdiction, and before such a Court the alien must appear and satisfy the Court, that he has two years previously, before a similar Court or its clerk, declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and shall further satisfy the Court by proofs, that he has resided five years in the United States, one year preceding his application, in the State where he applies, that he has behaved as a person of good moral character, is attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same; and it is upon the Court's finding all these facts in favor of the applicant, that it is authorized to admit him to citizenship, by administering to him the oath of allegiance to the Government of the United States. Here, then, is an

application that is to be made to a Court in which witnesses are to be sworn, law and fact decided, constituting every element of a judicial case. And is it not clearly such? In the case of Gorham vs. Luckett, 6 B. Monroe, Judge Marshall says, "Whenever a matter is referred to a Court, involving the finding of a fact or decision of a question of law, the power is judicial." Hence it has been held in this State, that the appointment of an administrator, removal of a jailor, or guardian, the probate of a dead when required to be done in Court, are judicial and not ministerial or executive acts. But the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States upon this precise question, is clear and decisive. In the case of Spratt vs. Spratt, 4 Peters, the question directly arose upon the character of this process of naturalization. In that case the record of naturalization did not show that all the requisites of the statute had been complied with, except from general recitals in the certificate, and was argued by Cox, that the process of naturalization, was ministerial and not judicial, and being ministerial in the absence of proof that every step was regular, the certificate was void, and did not constitute the holder a citizen. On the other hand it was argued by Jones & Key, that the process was judicial, and being such, every presumption should be indulged to support it, &c. Upon this question Ch. J. Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said, "The various acts upon the subject, submit the decision of the rights of aliens to admission as citizens to Courts of Record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the laws, and to judge on both law and fact. This judgment is entered on record as the judgment of the Court. It seems to us if it be in legal form, to close all inquiry, and like every other judgment, to be complete evidence of its own validity."

On such conclusive authority, I am not at liberty, therefore, to reach any other conclusion than that the process of naturalization is judicial, and can only be entertained by Courts having jurisdiction to do so.

The question remains, is it competent for Congress, under the Constitution, to confer jurisdiction upon the State Courts. In the consideration of this question, it is to be assumed that the power of Congress, over the subject of naturalization is plenary and exclusive, and the States possess no authority, independent or concurrent, in relation to it; Chirac vs. Chirac, 2 Wheaton 295; 2 Story on the Constitution, sec. 1102. Being a subject, then within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, which has been regulated by a law of Congress, constituting them judicial cases, it might be well asked, if the judicial power of the United States over them was not alike exclusive. But I do not consider it necessary to discuss this question. If it be conceded that the State Courts may exercise a concurrent jurisdiction, the conclusion must be the same. Congress may permit this concurrence of jurisdiction, but cannot confer it. The Government of the United States is one of limited powers, and can only exercise such as are plainly granted or are necessary to execute the granted powers. It has authority to vest its judicial power in United States Courts, and there is no grant of power to vest any portion of it in State Courts. Nor does it possess any such implied power. It has express authority to create Courts of its own, *ad libitum*, and it would be difficult to imagine a necessity in this respect, which it could not supply from its own plainly granted powers. But this question has been so directly and authoritatively settled, both by the Supreme Court of the United States in the City Court of Lexington, may not be valid as a judicial act for the want of jurisdiction, yet Congress had power to make it valid as an act of naturalization and having done so, citizenship is thereby conferred. It is a sufficient answer to this argument to say that the act of naturalization under the rule prescribed by Congress is judicial and not otherwise, and that the plaintiff must show title to citizenship through a judgment of a Court--Spratt vs. Spratt, 4 Peters, Starke vs. the Chesapeake Insurance Company, 7 Cranch--Towles case, 5 Leighs vs. Reports. Now has this plaintiff any judgment of citizenship? Has he offered any evidence of compliance with the act except the certificate granted him by the City Court? And is the decision of a Court without jurisdiction that he has complied with the act a judgment in any proper sense of the term? Is its certificate evidence of anything? The only answer that can be given to these questions is a sufficient refutation of the argument.

The conclusion which I have reached upon the second cause of demurral renders it unnecessary to decide the third cause and it will be omitted until a case shall arise requiring it. Wherefore for the reasons given I am of opinion that the plaintiff is not a citizen and therefore had no right to vote and the defendant has inflicted upon him no injury for which he can maintain this suit, and the second cause of demurral to the plaintiff's petition is sustained.

JOHNSON & THOMAS, for Plaintiffs. ROBERTSON & PREWITT, for Defendant.

A SURVIVOR OF THE KANE EXPLORING EXPEDITION IN LIMBO--Wm. C. Godfrey, who rendered himself somewhat conspicuous by his conduct during the last Kane Expedition, and by his recent publication of a book of his adventures, was before Alderman Emed this afternoon in a new character. He was charged with being guilty of bigamy and larceny.

Three of the reputed wives of Godfrey were present during the hearing, and they laughed and chattered with their husband as though they were not much distressed at the awkward predicament in which he had placed them.

Ellen Godfrey, formerly Ellen Reed, testified that she was married to Godfrey on the 20th of June last, by the Rev. Mr. DeWolf; she was acquainted with the defendant about a year before she married him; she had no suspicion that he was a married man.

Wm. J. Fetters testified that the defendant was married to his sister on the 29th of March, 1851, by Alderman Dennis; he never lived much with her.

A certificate of marriage was shown and proven. A woman was then called up as a witness, but she denied being the wife of Godfrey. The latter, she stated, had always promised to marry her as soon as he could, but he had never done it.

Officer Young stated that this woman had told him that Godfrey was married to her by the Rev. Mr. Atwood, now of Baltimore. The officer also stated that the defendant had another wife in West Philadelphia.

The accused was then arraigned on the charge of larceny. It was in evidence that Samuel Berry was somewhat intoxicated at the time, had been robbed of a watch at Dura's hotel, at the corner of Third and Dock streets, on Tuesday night.

Godfrey was in company with Berry about the time the robbery was committed.

Godfrey denied having had anything to do with the larceny of the watch.

The Alderman said there was sufficient evidence to hold him to bail on all the charges against him. The defendant was committed in default of bail to answer.

Godfrey must be a desperately gay deceiver--Dr. Kane, in his book, intimates that Godfrey was after an Esquimaux wife when he left him in the Arctic regions. *Philadelphia Bulletin* Thursday.

NEW ORLEANS, Sept. 19. The details of the loss of the Central American, published exclusively by the associated press this morning, cast a gloom over the community.

The difficulty between Walker and Colonel Kewen is entirely explained away in a letter from Walker.

Gilbert Stuart, the celebrated portrait painter, once met a lady in the street, in Boston, who saluted him with: "Ab, Mr. Stuart, I have just seen your minaret, and kissed it because it was so much like you!" "And did it kiss you in return?" Why no. "Then," said Stuart, "it was not like me."

"Joe, what makes your nose so red?" "Friendship." "Friendship! How do you make that out?" "I've got a friend who is very fond of brandy, and he is too weak to take it strong; I've constituted myself his taster."

case of Campbell vs. Gordon the alien was naturalized in a District Court of Virginia, and in the case of Starke vs. the Chesapeake Ins. Co., the naturalization took place in a Court of Pennsylvania, and in the other cases the naturalization took place in the State Courts of the respective States in which they are reported. All these naturalizing Courts were Courts of *general common law jurisdiction*, and all of them had jurisdiction under a State statute passed before the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Now, although the laws of Congress superseded these several State statutes as to the mode of constituting aliens citizens they did not in express terms take away this antecedent jurisdiction of the State Courts—but in express terms authorized its exercise.

Now the question whether the State Courts can exercise an antecedent jurisdiction, concurrently with the United States Courts, upon those subjects over which Congress, under the Constitution, has the exclusive power of legislation, is very different from the one, whether Congress can confer jurisdiction, in the same class of cases, upon the State Courts which never had such antecedent jurisdiction and none subsequently conferred by State law. Respectable authority may be found in support of the former proposition, (such as Collett vs. Collett, 2 Dallas and the cases I am considering,) whilst nothing beyond a loose and inconsiderate practice, has been referred to, or found in support of the latter proposition. And most I give such authoritative weight to this practice, as to make a citizen in damages for disregarding it as having the force of law, and that, too, in the face of the decisions of the Supreme Court of U. S., and Court of Appeals of Kentucky, before quoted? I think not.

Discussing the question whether it was com-

## THE GIRAFFE IS COMING

AND

S. P. STICKNEY & CO'S

GREAT SOUTHERN CIRCUS,

UNITED WITH

HERR DRIESBACH & CO'S

MENAGERIE

AND

CIRCUS!

One Consolidated Exhibition!

THE LARGEST IN AMERICA!

250 MEN AND HORSES!!!

Only One Price to the whole!

MANAGER C. L. WHEELER.

CLOWN, SAM LATERROP.

BEFORE TAKING

AFTER TAKING

STRENGTHENING CORDIAL

AND BLOOD PURIFIER.

Tell greatest remedy in the world. This Cordial is distilled from a Balsm known only to the author, and identified with the most valuable medicinal roots, herbs and barks known to the mind of man, viz: blood root, black root, wild cherry bark, yellow dock, dandelion, sarsaparilla, elder flowers, with others, producing the most infallible remedy for the restoration of health.

IT IS NATURE'S OWN REMEDY.

Curing diseases by natural laws. When taken, its healing influences is felt coursing through every vein of the body, purifying and accelerating the circulation of the blood. It neutralizes all bilious matter in the stomach, and removes all the poisons of the system.

McLean's Strengthening Cordial will effectually cure Liver complaints, Dyspepsia, Jaundies,

Chorea or Nervous Debility, Diseases of the Kidneys, and all Diseases arising from a Disordered Liver or Stomach.

Dyspepsia, Heartburn, Inward Piles, Acidity or Sickness of the Stomach, Headache, Faintness in the Head, Fullness or Weight in the Head, Palpitation of the Heart, Fullness or Weight in the Stomach, Sour Emotions, Choking or Suffocating Feeling when lying down, Dryness or Yellowness of the Skin and Eyes, Night Sweats, Inward Fever, Pain in the Small of the Back, Cramps in the Limbs, Loss of Appetite, Loss of the Senses of the Skin, Frightful Dreams, Langor, Despondency, or any Nervous Disease, Sores or Ulcers on the Skin, and Fever and Ague (or Chills and Fever). It will also cure diseases of the Bladder and Womb, such as Seminal Weakness, Incontinence of Urine, Strangury, Inflammation or Weakness of the Womb or Bladder, Whites, &c.

THESE ARE NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT.

This Cordial will never fail to cure any of the above diseases, and will be a great relief to all.

OVER HALF A MILLION OF BOTTLES

Have been sold during the past six months, and in no instance has failed in giving entire satisfaction. Who has not suffered from weakness or debility when *McLean's Strengthening Cordial* will cure you.

TO THE PUBLIC.

Do you wish to be healthy and strong? Then go at once and get some of *McLean's Cordial*. It will strengthen and invigorate your blood to flow through every vein, and rich rosy bloom of health to mount to your cheek again. Every bottle warranted to give satisfaction.

FOR CHILDREN.

We say to parents, if your children are sickly, puny, or afflicted with complaints prevalent among children, give them a small quantity of *McLean's Cordial*, and it will make them healthy. *McLean's Cordial* Delay a moment, and it will be caughed again.

IT IS DELIGHTFUL TO TAKE.

EVERY COUNTRY MERCHANT.

Should not leave the city until he had procured a supply of *McLean's Strengthening Cordial*. It sells rapidly, and causes many cures. General discount will be made to those who buy in large quantities.

CATION--Beware of druggists or dealers who may try to paluon you some Bitter or Sarsaparilla trash, which they can buy cheap, by saying it is just as good.

McLean's Strengthening Cordial is the only remedy that will purify the blood thoroughly, and at the same time strengthen the system.

One tablespoonful taken every morning fasting is a certain preventive for Cholera, Chills and Fever, Yellow Fever, or any prevalent disease.

Price only \$1 per bottle, or six bottles for \$5.

J. H. MCLEAN, Sole proprietor of the Cordial.

Also, *McLean's Volcanic Oil Liniment*.

It is a true copy from the original on file in this office.

THO. S. PAGE, Auditor.

Frankfort, Ky., July 1, 1857.

AUDITOR'S OFFICE,

Frankfort, Ky., July 1, 1857.

This is to certify that J. M. MILLIS, as Agent of the Charter Oak Life Insurance Co., of Hartford, Conn., at Frankfort, Ky., has been duly authorized in this office to make all necessary arrangements for the execution of the act, entitled, "An act to regulate Agencies of Foreign Insurance Companies," approved March 3, 1856; and it having been shown to the

# THE COMMONWEALTH.

FRANKFORT.

THOMAS M. GREEN, Editor.

WEDNESDAY.....SEPT. 23, 1857.

JUDGE GOODLOE'S DECISION.—In another column we publish the decision of Judge Goodloe in the case of Hagan vs. Dudley. Our readers will remember that Dudley was the Sheriff at one of the polls in Lexington, and consequently had the casting vote in the event of any difference of opinion arising in the minds of the Judges as to the right of any person to vote. Hagan is an Irishman who had been naturalized by the City Court of Lexington, within sixty days immediately preceding the day of the election. When he offered to vote the Judges of the polls differed as to his being a legal voter, and the case being referred to Dudley as Sheriff, he rejected Hagan's vote on the grounds, first, that the City Court of Lexington had no right to naturalize foreigners; and, second, that Hagan had not resided in that precinct sixty days after naturalization. This case embraces the points which were at issue between M. C. Johnson, Esq., and Judge Robert-son.

The points which Judge Goodloe decides are as follows: That the act of naturalization is a judicial and not a ministerial act. And in support of this opinion he cites the decision of Judge Thomas A. Marshall, formerly Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Gorham vs. Luckett, which reads as follows: "Whenever a matter is referred to a Court, involving the finding of a fact or decision of a question of law, the power is judicial." As in the act of naturalization the Court is compelled to examine witnesses, compare the testimony, it, of course, involves the finding of a fact, and is, therefore, according to the decision of the highest judicial authority in Kentucky, a judicial decision. But Judge Goodloe goes beyond the decision of our State Courts and appeals to the highest Court of the nation in support of this part of his decision. In the case of Spratt vs. Spratt the question directly arose before the Supreme Court of the United States upon the character of this process of naturalization, and it was decided by the Supreme Court that the act of naturalizing a foreigner was a judicial, and not a ministerial act. Judge Goodloe quotes from Chief Justice John Marshall on this case, as follows: "The various acts upon the subject submit the decision of the rights of aliens to admission as citizens to Courts of Record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the laws, and to judge on both law and fact. This judgment is entered on record as the judgment of the Court. It seems to us, if it be in legal form, to close all inquiry, and like every other judgment, to be complete evidence of its own validity." With such authority before him, Judge Goodloe decides, first, that the process of naturalization is a judicial act.

Having maintained this position by his own cogent arguments and fortified it by quoting the opinions of some of the ablest jurists the country has ever produced, Judge Goodloe further decides that Congress cannot confer judicial power upon any other than the Courts created by Congress. If there is any statute in the State conferring concurrent jurisdiction upon the State Courts, Congress may permit the exercise of such jurisdiction, but Congress cannot confer such jurisdiction upon the State Courts. In Kentucky there is no statute conferring the right of naturalization upon the City Court of Lexington, nor was that Court created by Congress, and, therefore, it had no legal authority whatever to naturalize the man Hagan. Having arrived at this conclusion, Judge Goodloe dismissed the case—the grounds of the demurmer, as to the non sufficient residence of Hagan, after naturalization, not being properly before him or embraced in the case.

For ourselves we shall not at present attempt to pass an opinion as to the correctness of Judge Goodloe's judgment, further than that it is an exceedingly able document, clear and directly to the point, and it will be a difficult matter for those differing from him to produce arguments which will have a tendency to overthrow those advanced by him. The Democratic party will hardly be expected to agree with Judge Goodloe, for his decision takes the right of suffrage from a large number of their political allies. The case is an important one, and, will, we learn, be brought before the Court of Appeals. If the case is decided by this Court adverse to Hagan it can then be carried to the Supreme Court of the United States. This, we hope, will be the ultimate resort of the Democrats who are conducting the prosecution of Dudley, as it is highly important that the matter should be settled in such a manner as to leave it beyond all dispute or cavil. In the meantime, may we not hope that the Democratic press of the State will, instead of denouncing Judge Goodloe personally for having given what appears to them to be a partisan decision, attempt to show in what respect the decision is incorrect? It is a question of law and not of politics, and it should be argued by those engaging in its discussion as lawyers and not as pot-house politicians. The question is not whether it will be in favor of the American or the Democratic party, but it is one which involves the suffrage of many thousands of men who have heretofore voted. If the manner in which they have been naturalized is illegal, it is due to the native born citizen and to the legally naturalized foreigners that they should not be permitted to vote until they have complied with the requisitions of the Constitution of the United States. But, if they have been legally naturalized, the right of suffrage ought by all means to be secured to them. The question can be definitely settled by the Supreme Court of the United States alone, and Democratic editors cannot assist that tribunal in forming a correct judgment as to the merits of the case by hurling their malice and scathing denunciations at Judge Goodloe.

THE BANK OF KANAWHA.—The Charleston' Kanawha Republican, of September 16th, says: "Our gallant Bank of Kanawha has, we believe, completely weathered the storm—and has reached the port of safety. It has promptly and fairly met all its liabilities. If its notes are not at par every where, all we have got to say, is they ought to be."

Mr. Ferguson, a wealthy citizen of Covington, has been arrested and held to bail in \$3,000 for assisting in the escape of fugitive slaves. Two negroes were implicated with him.

PERSONAL.—James Russell Lowell, Esq., was married at Portland on Wednesday to Miss Frances Dunlap, niece of ex-Governor Dunlap, of Portland. The ceremony took place at St. John's Church.

THE GIRAFFE AND CIRCUS.—Our readers will see that on next Tuesday, they will have an opportunity to see a living Giraffe, which they may never have again, as this is said to be the only one in the United States. Other rare animals will also be exhibited. S. P. STICKNEY who is so well known as the best rider on 4 and 6 horses, has over appeared before the public, will also be here, and give an exhibition at the same time, in connection with the Menagerie. We take the following from the *Journal*, in relation to Stickney's performance in Louisville on Monday last:

THE CIRCUS.—Mr. Stickney, the Napoleon of equestrians and equestrian exhibitions, opened his pavilion last night to an immense audience. The riding of both males and females was splendid. Mr. S. has a splendid stud of horses, and the lauris he has gained in former years in the ring will remain untried. The band of music is excellent. The clown is one of the best we have ever seen. Barring Shakspearian quotations, as to his being a legal voter, and the case being referred to Dudley as Sheriff, he rejected Hagan's vote on the grounds, first, that the City Court of Lexington had no right to naturalize foreigners; and, second, that Hagan had not resided in that precinct sixty days after naturalization. This case embraces the points which were at issue between M. C. Johnson, Esq., and Judge Robert-son.

The points which Judge Goodloe decides are as follows: That the act of naturalization is a judicial and not a ministerial act. And in support of this opinion he cites the decision of Judge Thomas A. Marshall, formerly Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Gorham vs. Luckett, which reads as follows: "Whenever a matter is referred to a Court, involving the finding of a fact or decision of a question of law, the power is judicial." As in the act of naturalization the Court is compelled to examine witnesses, compare the testimony, it, of course, involves the finding of a fact, and is, therefore, according to the decision of the highest judicial authority in Kentucky, a judicial decision. But Judge Goodloe goes beyond the decision of our State Courts and appeals to the highest Court of the nation in support of this part of his decision. In the case of Spratt vs. Spratt the question directly arose before the Supreme Court of the United States upon the character of this process of naturalization, and it was decided by the Supreme Court that the act of naturalizing a foreigner was a judicial, and not a ministerial act. Judge Goodloe quotes from Chief Justice John Marshall on this case, as follows: "The various acts upon the subject submit the decision of the rights of aliens to admission as citizens to Courts of Record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the laws, and to judge on both law and fact. This judgment is entered on record as the judgment of the Court. It seems to us, if it be in legal form, to close all inquiry, and like every other judgment, to be complete evidence of its own validity." With such authority before him, Judge Goodloe decides, first, that the process of naturalization is a judicial act.

Having maintained this position by his own cogent arguments and fortified it by quoting the opinions of some of the ablest jurists the country has ever produced, Judge Goodloe further decides that Congress cannot confer judicial power upon any other than the Courts created by Congress. If there is any statute in the State conferring concurrent jurisdiction upon the State Courts, Congress may permit the exercise of such jurisdiction, but Congress cannot confer such jurisdiction upon the State Courts. In Kentucky there is no statute conferring the right of naturalization upon the City Court of Lexington, nor was that Court created by Congress, and, therefore, it had no legal authority whatever to naturalize the man Hagan. Having arrived at this conclusion, Judge Goodloe dismissed the case—the grounds of the demurmer, as to the non sufficient residence of Hagan, after naturalization, not being properly before him or embraced in the case.

THE GIRAFFE AND CIRCUS.—Our readers will see that on next Tuesday, they will have an opportunity to see a living Giraffe, which they may never have again, as this is said to be the only one in the United States. Other rare animals will also be exhibited. S. P. STICKNEY who is so well known as the best rider on 4 and 6 horses, has over appeared before the public, will also be here, and give an exhibition at the same time, in connection with the Menagerie. We take the following from the *Journal*, in relation to Stickney's performance in Louisville on Monday last:

THE CIRCUS.—Mr. Stickney, the Napoleon of equestrians and equestrian exhibitions, opened his pavilion last night to an immense audience. The riding of both males and females was splendid. Mr. S. has a splendid stud of horses, and the lauris he has gained in former years in the ring will remain untried. The band of music is excellent. The clown is one of the best we have ever seen. Barring Shakspearian quotations, as to his being a legal voter, and the case being referred to Dudley as Sheriff, he rejected Hagan's vote on the grounds, first, that the City Court of Lexington had no right to naturalize foreigners; and, second, that Hagan had not resided in that precinct sixty days after naturalization. This case embraces the points which were at issue between M. C. Johnson, Esq., and Judge Robert-son.

The points which Judge Goodloe decides are as follows: That the act of naturalization is a judicial and not a ministerial act. And in support of this opinion he cites the decision of Judge Thomas A. Marshall, formerly Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Gorham vs. Luckett, which reads as follows: "Whenever a matter is referred to a Court, involving the finding of a fact or decision of a question of law, the power is judicial." As in the act of naturalization the Court is compelled to examine witnesses, compare the testimony, it, of course, involves the finding of a fact, and is, therefore, according to the decision of the highest judicial authority in Kentucky, a judicial decision. But Judge Goodloe goes beyond the decision of our State Courts and appeals to the highest Court of the nation in support of this part of his decision. In the case of Spratt vs. Spratt the question directly arose before the Supreme Court of the United States upon the character of this process of naturalization, and it was decided by the Supreme Court that the act of naturalizing a foreigner was a judicial, and not a ministerial act. Judge Goodloe quotes from Chief Justice John Marshall on this case, as follows: "The various acts upon the subject submit the decision of the rights of aliens to admission as citizens to Courts of Record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the laws, and to judge on both law and fact. This judgment is entered on record as the judgment of the Court. It seems to us, if it be in legal form, to close all inquiry, and like every other judgment, to be complete evidence of its own validity." With such authority before him, Judge Goodloe decides, first, that the process of naturalization is a judicial act.

Having maintained this position by his own cogent arguments and fortified it by quoting the opinions of some of the ablest jurists the country has ever produced, Judge Goodloe further decides that Congress cannot confer judicial power upon any other than the Courts created by Congress. If there is any statute in the State conferring concurrent jurisdiction upon the State Courts, Congress may permit the exercise of such jurisdiction, but Congress cannot confer such jurisdiction upon the State Courts. In Kentucky there is no statute conferring the right of naturalization upon the City Court of Lexington, nor was that Court created by Congress, and, therefore, it had no legal authority whatever to naturalize the man Hagan. Having arrived at this conclusion, Judge Goodloe dismissed the case—the grounds of the demurmer, as to the non sufficient residence of Hagan, after naturalization, not being properly before him or embraced in the case.

THE GIRAFFE AND CIRCUS.—Our readers will see that on next Tuesday, they will have an opportunity to see a living Giraffe, which they may never have again, as this is said to be the only one in the United States. Other rare animals will also be exhibited. S. P. STICKNEY who is so well known as the best rider on 4 and 6 horses, has over appeared before the public, will also be here, and give an exhibition at the same time, in connection with the Menagerie. We take the following from the *Journal*, in relation to Stickney's performance in Louisville on Monday last:

THE CIRCUS.—Mr. Stickney, the Napoleon of equestrians and equestrian exhibitions, opened his pavilion last night to an immense audience. The riding of both males and females was splendid. Mr. S. has a splendid stud of horses, and the lauris he has gained in former years in the ring will remain untried. The band of music is excellent. The clown is one of the best we have ever seen. Barring Shakspearian quotations, as to his being a legal voter, and the case being referred to Dudley as Sheriff, he rejected Hagan's vote on the grounds, first, that the City Court of Lexington had no right to naturalize foreigners; and, second, that Hagan had not resided in that precinct sixty days after naturalization. This case embraces the points which were at issue between M. C. Johnson, Esq., and Judge Robert-son.

The points which Judge Goodloe decides are as follows: That the act of naturalization is a judicial and not a ministerial act. And in support of this opinion he cites the decision of Judge Thomas A. Marshall, formerly Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Gorham vs. Luckett, which reads as follows: "Whenever a matter is referred to a Court, involving the finding of a fact or decision of a question of law, the power is judicial." As in the act of naturalization the Court is compelled to examine witnesses, compare the testimony, it, of course, involves the finding of a fact, and is, therefore, according to the decision of the highest judicial authority in Kentucky, a judicial decision. But Judge Goodloe goes beyond the decision of our State Courts and appeals to the highest Court of the nation in support of this part of his decision. In the case of Spratt vs. Spratt the question directly arose before the Supreme Court of the United States upon the character of this process of naturalization, and it was decided by the Supreme Court that the act of naturalizing a foreigner was a judicial, and not a ministerial act. Judge Goodloe quotes from Chief Justice John Marshall on this case, as follows: "The various acts upon the subject submit the decision of the rights of aliens to admission as citizens to Courts of Record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the laws, and to judge on both law and fact. This judgment is entered on record as the judgment of the Court. It seems to us, if it be in legal form, to close all inquiry, and like every other judgment, to be complete evidence of its own validity." With such authority before him, Judge Goodloe decides, first, that the process of naturalization is a judicial act.

Having maintained this position by his own cogent arguments and fortified it by quoting the opinions of some of the ablest jurists the country has ever produced, Judge Goodloe further decides that Congress cannot confer judicial power upon any other than the Courts created by Congress. If there is any statute in the State conferring concurrent jurisdiction upon the State Courts, Congress may permit the exercise of such jurisdiction, but Congress cannot confer such jurisdiction upon the State Courts. In Kentucky there is no statute conferring the right of naturalization upon the City Court of Lexington, nor was that Court created by Congress, and, therefore, it had no legal authority whatever to naturalize the man Hagan. Having arrived at this conclusion, Judge Goodloe dismissed the case—the grounds of the demurmer, as to the non sufficient residence of Hagan, after naturalization, not being properly before him or embraced in the case.

THE GIRAFFE AND CIRCUS.—Our readers will see that on next Tuesday, they will have an opportunity to see a living Giraffe, which they may never have again, as this is said to be the only one in the United States. Other rare animals will also be exhibited. S. P. STICKNEY who is so well known as the best rider on 4 and 6 horses, has over appeared before the public, will also be here, and give an exhibition at the same time, in connection with the Menagerie. We take the following from the *Journal*, in relation to Stickney's performance in Louisville on Monday last:

THE CIRCUS.—Mr. Stickney, the Napoleon of equestrians and equestrian exhibitions, opened his pavilion last night to an immense audience. The riding of both males and females was splendid. Mr. S. has a splendid stud of horses, and the lauris he has gained in former years in the ring will remain untried. The band of music is excellent. The clown is one of the best we have ever seen. Barring Shakspearian quotations, as to his being a legal voter, and the case being referred to Dudley as Sheriff, he rejected Hagan's vote on the grounds, first, that the City Court of Lexington had no right to naturalize foreigners; and, second, that Hagan had not resided in that precinct sixty days after naturalization. This case embraces the points which were at issue between M. C. Johnson, Esq., and Judge Robert-son.

The points which Judge Goodloe decides are as follows: That the act of naturalization is a judicial and not a ministerial act. And in support of this opinion he cites the decision of Judge Thomas A. Marshall, formerly Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Gorham vs. Luckett, which reads as follows: "Whenever a matter is referred to a Court, involving the finding of a fact or decision of a question of law, the power is judicial." As in the act of naturalization the Court is compelled to examine witnesses, compare the testimony, it, of course, involves the finding of a fact, and is, therefore, according to the decision of the highest judicial authority in Kentucky, a judicial decision. But Judge Goodloe goes beyond the decision of our State Courts and appeals to the highest Court of the nation in support of this part of his decision. In the case of Spratt vs. Spratt the question directly arose before the Supreme Court of the United States upon the character of this process of naturalization, and it was decided by the Supreme Court that the act of naturalizing a foreigner was a judicial, and not a ministerial act. Judge Goodloe quotes from Chief Justice John Marshall on this case, as follows: "The various acts upon the subject submit the decision of the rights of aliens to admission as citizens to Courts of Record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the laws, and to judge on both law and fact. This judgment is entered on record as the judgment of the Court. It seems to us, if it be in legal form, to close all inquiry, and like every other judgment, to be complete evidence of its own validity." With such authority before him, Judge Goodloe decides, first, that the process of naturalization is a judicial act.

Having maintained this position by his own cogent arguments and fortified it by quoting the opinions of some of the ablest jurists the country has ever produced, Judge Goodloe further decides that Congress cannot confer judicial power upon any other than the Courts created by Congress. If there is any statute in the State conferring concurrent jurisdiction upon the State Courts, Congress may permit the exercise of such jurisdiction, but Congress cannot confer such jurisdiction upon the State Courts. In Kentucky there is no statute conferring the right of naturalization upon the City Court of Lexington, nor was that Court created by Congress, and, therefore, it had no legal authority whatever to naturalize the man Hagan. Having arrived at this conclusion, Judge Goodloe dismissed the case—the grounds of the demurmer, as to the non sufficient residence of Hagan, after naturalization, not being properly before him or embraced in the case.

THE GIRAFFE AND CIRCUS.—Our readers will see that on next Tuesday, they will have an opportunity to see a living Giraffe, which they may never have again, as this is said to be the only one in the United States. Other rare animals will also be exhibited. S. P. STICKNEY who is so well known as the best rider on 4 and 6 horses, has over appeared before the public, will also be here, and give an exhibition at the same time, in connection with the Menagerie. We take the following from the *Journal*, in relation to Stickney's performance in Louisville on Monday last:

THE CIRCUS.—Mr. Stickney, the Napoleon of equestrians and equestrian exhibitions, opened his pavilion last night to an immense audience. The riding of both males and females was splendid. Mr. S. has a splendid stud of horses, and the lauris he has gained in former years in the ring will remain untried. The band of music is excellent. The clown is one of the best we have ever seen. Barring Shakspearian quotations, as to his being a legal voter, and the case being referred to Dudley as Sheriff, he rejected Hagan's vote on the grounds, first, that the City Court of Lexington had no right to naturalize foreigners; and, second, that Hagan had not resided in that precinct sixty days after naturalization. This case embraces the points which were at issue between M. C. Johnson, Esq., and Judge Robert-son.

The points which Judge Goodloe decides are as follows: That the act of naturalization is a judicial and not a ministerial act. And in support of this opinion he cites the decision of Judge Thomas A. Marshall, formerly Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Gorham vs. Luckett, which reads as follows: "Whenever a matter is referred to a Court, involving the finding of a fact or decision of a question of law, the power is judicial." As in the act of naturalization the Court is compelled to examine witnesses, compare the testimony, it, of course, involves the finding of a fact, and is, therefore, according to the decision of the highest judicial authority in Kentucky, a judicial decision. But Judge Goodloe goes beyond the decision of our State Courts and appeals to the highest Court of the nation in support of this part of his decision. In the case of Spratt vs. Spratt the question directly arose before the Supreme Court of the United States upon the character of this process of naturalization, and it was decided by the Supreme Court that the act of naturalizing a foreigner was a judicial, and not a ministerial act. Judge Goodloe quotes from Chief Justice John Marshall on this case, as follows: "The various acts upon the subject submit the decision of the rights of aliens to admission as citizens to Courts of Record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the laws, and to judge on both law and fact. This judgment is entered on record as the judgment of the Court. It seems to us, if it be in legal form, to close all inquiry, and like every other judgment, to be complete evidence of its own validity." With such authority before him, Judge Goodloe decides, first, that the process of naturalization is a judicial act.

Having maintained this position by his own cogent arguments and fortified it by quoting the opinions of some of the ablest jurists the country has ever produced, Judge Goodloe further decides that Congress cannot confer judicial power upon any other than the Courts created by Congress. If there is any statute in the State conferring concurrent jurisdiction upon the State Courts, Congress may permit the exercise of such jurisdiction, but Congress cannot confer such jurisdiction upon the State Courts. In Kentucky there is no statute conferring the right of naturalization upon the City Court of Lexington, nor was that Court created by Congress, and, therefore, it had no legal authority whatever to naturalize the man Hagan. Having arrived at this conclusion, Judge Goodloe dismissed the case—the grounds of the demurmer, as to the non sufficient residence of Hagan, after naturalization, not being properly before him or embraced in the case.

THE GIRAFFE AND CIRCUS.—Our readers will see that on next Tuesday, they will have an opportunity to see a living Giraffe, which they may never have again, as this is said to be the only one in the United States. Other rare animals will also be exhibited. S. P. STICKNEY who is so well known as the best rider on 4 and 6 horses, has over appeared before the public, will also be here, and give an exhibition at the same time, in connection with the Menagerie. We take the following from the *Journal*, in relation to Stickney's performance in Louisville on Monday last:

THE CIRCUS.—Mr. Stickney, the Napoleon of equestrians and equestrian exhibitions, opened his pavilion last night to an immense audience. The riding of both males and females was splendid. Mr. S. has a splendid stud of horses, and the lauris he has gained in former years in the ring will remain untried. The band of music is excellent. The clown is one of the best we have ever seen. Barring Shakspearian quotations, as to his being a legal voter, and the case being referred to Dudley as Sheriff, he rejected Hagan's vote on the grounds, first, that the City Court of Lexington had no right to naturalize foreigners; and, second, that Hagan had not resided in that precinct sixty days after naturalization. This case embraces the points which were at issue between M. C. Johnson, Esq., and Judge Robert-son.

The points which Judge Goodloe decides are as follows: That the act of naturalization is a judicial and not a ministerial act. And in support of this opinion he cites the decision of Judge Thomas A. Marshall, formerly Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Gorham vs. Luckett, which reads as follows: "Whenever a matter is referred to a Court, involving the finding of a fact or decision of a question of law, the power is judicial." As in the act of naturalization the Court is compelled to examine witnesses, compare the testimony, it, of course, involves the finding of a fact, and is, therefore, according to the decision of the highest judicial authority in Kentucky, a judicial decision. But Judge Goodloe goes beyond the decision of our State Courts and appeals to the highest Court of the nation in support of this part of his decision. In the case of Spratt vs. Spratt the question directly arose before the Supreme Court of the United States upon the character of this process of naturalization, and it was decided by the Supreme Court that the act of naturalizing a foreigner was a judicial, and not a ministerial act. Judge Goodloe quotes from Chief Justice John Marshall on this case, as follows: "The various acts upon the subject submit the decision of the rights of aliens to admission as citizens to Courts of Record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the laws, and to judge on both law and fact. This judgment is entered on record as the judgment of the Court. It seems to us, if it be in legal form, to close all inquiry, and like every other judgment, to be complete evidence of its own validity." With such authority before him, Judge Goodloe decides, first, that the process of naturalization is a judicial act.

Having maintained this position by his own cogent arguments and fortified it by quoting the opinions of some of the ablest jurists the country has ever produced, Judge Goodloe further decides that Congress cannot confer judicial power upon any other than the Courts created by Congress. If there is any statute in the State conferring concurrent jurisdiction upon the State Courts, Congress may permit the exercise of such jurisdiction, but Congress cannot confer such jurisdiction upon the State Courts

## KEENE &amp; CO'S COLUMN.

W. H. KEENE. B. H. CRITTENDEN.

## KEENE &amp; CO.,

WHOLESALE AND RETAIL DEALERS IN

CHOICE GROCERIES, LIQUORS, TO-

BACCO, CIGARS,

AND

ALL KINDS OF COUNTRY

PRODUCE,

St. Clair and Wapping Streets,

FRANKFORT, KY.

All accounts due 1st of January, May, and September, interest charged after maturity.

ANGUST 1st, 1857.

JUST RECEIVED, IN STORE AND FOR SALE

Groceries.

N. O. Sugar: Crushed Sugar; Refined Sugar; Loaf Sugar; Preserving Sugar.

Eastern and St. Louis brands.

Coffee.

Old Government Jars; Prime Rio; Mocha.

Molasses.

Plantation, (bbls and half do.) Sanger House; Golden Syrup; Maple.

Soap and Candles.

German; Star; Castile; Rosin; Sperm.

Fish.

Mackarel, (assorted numbers and packages.) Potomac Herring; Smoked Herring; Shad.

Liquors.

Pale Old Brand; Claret Wine; Hennessee Brand; Old Port Wine; Jules Robbins Brand; Sherry Wine; Holland Gin; Madeira Wine; Roederer &amp; Schreider Champagne.

STANDARD AND SWEET.

Jameson's Rum; Irish Whisky; Pure Apple Brandy, 8 years old; Rye Whisky, (aged) Old Bourbon Whisky; Domestic Whisky, Brandy, Wine and Gin; Tennent's Pale Ale; Boker's Bitters; Younger's Pale Ale; Abbott's Brown Stout.

Meats and Lard.

Plain and Canvassed Hams; Dried Beef, (canvassed)

Clear and Ribbed Sides; Buffalo and Beef Tongues;

Pork House and Country Shoulders; Venison Hams.

Wooden Ware, &amp;c.

Cedar Pails, Buckets; Painted Tubs and Buckets; Tub, Cans, Measures; Clothes and Market Baskets; Cocos Dippers; Kite; Pepper; Crackers; Spices; Cinnamon; Macaroni; Spices; Green and Blk Tea; Vermicelli.

Hardware.

Nails, (all sizes.) Pad Locks; Shovels and Spades; Butts; Axe, Hoes; Screws; Tack Chains; Tack; Preserving Kettles; Butcher Knives; Mowing Blades; Grain Scythes;

Tobacco and Cigars.

Holland's Brown Vesta; Turkish Smoking Tobacco; Old Dug; Spanish Smoking Tobacco; El Dorado; Sealife; Anderson's "Solace" Fine Cut; Common; Amulet; De Carbago Havana Cigars; Club House; Half Spanish Cigars; El Tulipan; Rio Sella.

Agricultural.

Corn Shellers; Cradles, Snaethes, &amp;c.; Sanford's Straw Cutter; Little Indian Corn and Cob Crushers; A fine supply of Seeds in proper season.

Flour and Meal.

Superfine and extra Family Flour; Corn Meal.

Paints, &amp;c.

White Lead; Yellow Ochre; Whiting; Venetian Red; Lard Oil; Linseed Oil.

Sundries.

Sewed Oysters, Cove Oysters, Sardines, Prunes, Lemons, Lemon Syrup, Burrowed and French Mustard, Blacking and Blacking Brushes, Cotton Cords, Brooms (Floor and Clothes.) Vinegar, (Pure Cider.) Indigo.

Wrapping Paper, (Brown and White.) Cork Bottles, Demijohn Bottles, Brandy Peaches, French Olives, Curry Powder, Turnips, Fresh Peaches, Fresh Salmon, Strawberries, Fresh Pine Apple, Plain Apple Cheese, Dairy Salt, Pepper, Shot, Caps, Wads, Proof Vials, Herring, (Duke Lines,) Mapse, (Floor and Tea.) Utica Lime, Holme's Cement, Axe Helves, Glass Preserving Jars, Glass Milk Pans.

SAUCES. EXTRACTS.

Peach, Almond, Celery, Milk, Lemon, Orange Flower Water, Peach do. do.

PICKLES.

Green Pickles, Oysters.

TABLE OIL.

Laces and Flagonoil; with a general assortment of articles in our line.

BARRELS FRESH UTICA LIME, by steamer

Aug. 7, 1857.

HOBBS &amp; CO.

WM. H. GRAY.

JAS. M. TODD

GRAY & TODD,  
CONFECTIONERS AND DEALERS IN  
FINE GROCERIES OF ALL KINDS,  
Fine Teas, Spices, Fruits, Nuts,  
English and American Sauces and Pickles, Hayan  
Cigars, Foreign and American Sweet Meats, &c.  
—ALSO—  
PURE WINES, BRANDIES, &c., &c.  
OLD STAND, CORNER MAIN AND LEWIS STREETS,  
FRANKFORT, KY.WE are now receiving a complete and choice selec-  
tion of GROCERIES, LIQUORS, CIGARS, &c.,  
consisting in part of  
10 bbls. N. O. Sugar  
30 lbs. Eastern Refined Sugar  
30 lbs. Eastern Powdered Sugar  
10 lbs. Eastern Granulated Sugar  
4 boxes Double Refined Loaf Sugar  
5 bbls small Loaf Sugar; just received and for  
sale by

GRAY &amp; TODD.

MOLASSES—  
15 lbs Plautation Molasses, prime article.  
5 lbs. bbls Plautation Molasses, prime article;  
Just received and for sale by

GRAY &amp; TODD.

COFFEE—  
50 sacks Old Eastern Rio Coffee, No. 1 article;  
40 sacks Java Coffee, very fine; in store and for  
sale by

GRAY &amp; TODD.

CANDLES—  
75 boxes Star Candles, assorted numbers;  
20 boxes hard pressed Tallow Candles; in store and  
for sale by

GRAY &amp; TODD.

SOAP—  
25 boxes No. 1 Rosin Soap;  
10 boxes German Soap;  
10 boxes of Saponified Hand Soap;  
Fancy Soap perfumed of every style;  
2 boxes Castile Soap; in store and for sale by

GRAY &amp; TODD.

CHEESE—  
10 boxes New York Cheese, very fine;  
20 boxes English Dairy in small boxes;  
6 boxes Pine-Apple;  
1 case Holland; in store and for sale by

GRAY &amp; TODD.

PORT AND DOMESTIC LIQUORS, BY THE BOTTLE or PINT—We have in store a full assortment  
BRANDIES, WINES, AND GIN;Also, 10 barrels Whisky 4 year old; 50 barrels 2 year old;  
in store and for sale by

GRAY &amp; TODD.

FRUITS—  
Oranges, Lemons  
Pine-Apples, Figs  
Raisins, Cucumbers,  
Prunes, Almonds, Pecans;  
and every variety of bottle and can fruit up fresh;  
and all other articles usually kept in a confectionery; in  
store and for sale by

GRAY &amp; TODD.

LARD—  
120 kegs No. 1 Leaf Lard; in store and for sale by

GRAY &amp; TODD.

First in Market!  
JUST RECEIVED 5 barrels NEW POTATOES, and  
for sale by

GRAY &amp; TODD.

EASTERN SYRUP—  
75 bbls Baltimore Syrup, No. 1 article.  
10 bbls New York Syrup, No. 1 article.  
5 half bbls New York Syrup, No. 1 article.  
10 ten gallon kegs Baltimore Syrup, No. 1 article;  
just received and for sale by

GRAY &amp; TODD.

LIME AND CEMENT—  
100 lbs. Lime; 10 bbls Cement.Our stock of Groceries, Liquors, Sugars, Tobacco and  
Food Goods is now full and complete, embracing a  
great many articles too numerous to mention.

GRAY &amp; TODD.

GEO. A. ROBERTSON,  
DEALER INCONFECTIONERIES & GROCERIES,  
Corner St. Clair and Broadway Streets,HAS on hand the choicest articles in his line,  
which he will sell at the lowest market prices.

BEN. F. GRAHAM.

CANDIES—  
Just received from New York twenty varieties of  
FRENCH PREMIUM CANDIES.

GEO. A. ROBERTSON.

BRANDIES—  
A lot of the finest FRENCH BRANDIES at twenty  
per cent below the market rates.

GEO. A. ROBERTSON.

A PURE article of PEACH AND APPLE BRANDY,  
in store and for sale low by

GEO. A. ROBERTSON.

WHISKY—  
OLD BOURBON WHISKY by the gallon or bottle,  
for sale by

GEO. A. ROBERTSON.

WINES—  
The best quality of MADEIRA, SHERRY, PORT,  
ST. JULIAN, CHAMPAGNE, and MALAGA WINES,  
cheaper than at any other establishment in the city.

GEO. A. ROBERTSON.

AMERICAN AND ITALIAN  
MARBLE WORKS,WILLIAM CRAIK,  
Opposite the Post-office, St. Clair Street,  
FRANKFORT, KY.HAVING purchased  
of KNIGHT & CLARK  
their entire stock of  
Marble Monuments, Tombstones, &c., I will con-  
fine myself to the following order  
Monuments, Tablets, Tomb-Head-Stones,  
Cemetery Posts, Table Tops, Counters  
and all articles of marble, in  
the style of the best  
designers and carvers  
in Philadelphia, and I  
pledge myself to get up  
better work than has  
ever been published in  
Frankfort, and as  
good as can be obtained  
elsewhere.

Call and See.

IRON RAILING, VERANDAHS, &amp;c.

I have a great variety of designs at the shop, and  
will furnish the work to manufacturers price.

WILLIAM CRAIK.

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES  
OF THE  
CONVENTION,  
CALLED TO MODIFY, AMEND OR RE-ADOPT  
THE CONSTITUTION OF KENTUCKY,  
(OFFICIAL REPORT.)New published and for sale at the COMMONWEALTH  
OFFICE, at \$5 per copy.The work contains 1130 pages, and is bound in the best  
Law Binding.FRUIT AND ORNAMENTAL  
TREES, VINES, SHRUBS, &c.,  
CULTIVATED AND FOR SALE

BY

ED. D. HOBBS & J. W. WALKER,  
AT THE EVERGREEN NURSERIESTwelve miles East of Louisville, Ky., immediately on the  
Louisville and Frankfort Railroad.NEATLY printed Catalogue of  
the Fruits, Ornamentals, Trees,  
Vines, Shrubs, &c., at the above  
Nursery, will be had  
by application to A. G. Hobbs.

DAVID MITCHELL.

100 BBLs. KANAWHA SALT, for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

12 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES PIN  
APPLES, for sale and for sale by

W. A. GAINES.

100 CASES FRESH PEACHES AND 12 CASES